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ABSTRACT
Despite the success of crowdsourcing, the question of ethics
has not yet been addressed in its entirety. Existing efforts
have studied fairness in worker compensation and in help-
ing requesters detect malevolent workers. In this paper, we
propose fairness axioms that generalize existing work and
pave the way to studying fairness for task assignment, task
completion, and worker compensation. Transparency on the
other hand, has been addressed with the development of
plug-ins and forums to track workers’ performance and rate
requesters. Similarly to fairness, we define transparency ax-
ioms and advocate the need to address it in a holistic manner
by providing declarative specifications. We also discuss how
fairness and transparency could be enforced and evaluated
in a crowdsourcing platform.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The success of crowdsourcing is undeniable. Many tasks
ranging from image recognition to sentiment analysis, are
routinely deployed and completed by a pool of workers ready
to be solicited. It is therefore timely to start addressing fair-
ness and transparency in crowdsourcing, two key questions
that are of interest today in ethics.1 Existing work on fair-
ness has primarily focused on studying worker compensation
or on helping requesters identify malevolent workers [2, 17,
21, 20, 19]. For transparency, tools and plug-ins have been
developed to disclose computed information such as work-
ers’ performance and requesters’ ratings [3, 6, 9, 15]. In this
paper, we argue that a holistic approach to both fairness
and transparency is necessary because of the dependencies
between crowdsourcing processes. We define fairness and
transparency axioms that serve as a basis for our framework
and discuss implementation and evaluation.
1http://www.fatml.org/
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Our first endeavor is to understand fair crowdsourcing.
Discrimination against individuals is generally defined ac-
cording to the attributes of those individuals [5]. For exam-
ple, Google’s advertising displays ads for high-income jobs
to men much more often than it does to women; and ads for
arrest records are most often associated to search queries
for common African-American names [18]. In crowdsourc-
ing, even if workers are assigned tasks fairly, the attributes
used in task assignment may not have been inferred fairly.
It is therefore crucial to characterize fairness in a holistic
fashion. We define a set of fairness axioms that capture and
generalize existing approaches. For example, we state that
in task assignment, two workers with the same qualifications
should have access to the same tasks. Similarly, comparable
tasks offered by two different requesters should be equally
visible to workers. In task completion, fairness to workers
means letting them complete tasks without interruption.
Our second question is about transparent crowdsourcing.
Intuitively, a crowdsourcing platform that provides better
transparency would generate less frustration among workers
and see better worker retention. This realization is not new,
and several proposals have addressed transparency in crowd-
sourcing from requester and platform perspectives. Requester
transparency reveals details such as recruitment criteria, the
conditions under which work may be rejected, and the time
before workers’ contributions are approved. Platform trans-
parency, e.g., providing feedback to workers on their per-
formance, has also been addressed [12]. Several tools and
forums have been developed to disclose information to work-
ers. For example, Turkopticon [9] provides a plug-in to AMT
that helps workers determine which HITs do not pay fairly
and which requesters have been reviewed by other work-
ers. Turker Nation 2 is an online forum that lets workers
exchange information about the latest available HITs and
their opinion on requesters. CrowdFlower 3 displays a panel
with the worker’s estimated accuracy so far. In this paper,
we advocate that a single framework is needed to express and
enforce transparency. We believe it is essential to provide
declarative languages to help requesters and platform devel-
opers express what they want to make transparent. Such a
solution would also facilitate sharing and comparing trans-
parency choices across platforms.
The question of how to validate fairness and transparency
in crowdsourcing also merits attention. A common approach
is to design appropriate user studies that gather the expe-
rience of workers and requesters with specific implementa-
2http://www.turkernation.com/
3https://www.crowdflower.com/
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tions of fairness and transparency. Such an approach was
used in [12] to validate that feedback contributes to increas-
ing workers’ motivation. In this paper, we wish to define
a validation protocol based on objective measures and pro-
pose to quantify measures such as contributions quality for
fairness and worker retention for transparency.
We believe that our proposal paves the way for checking
fairness and transparency in existing crowdsourcing systems
and also for enforcing them by design in newly developed
systems. Section 2 contains a review of fairness and trans-
parency in crowdsourcing and other related areas. Section 3
illustrates the need for fairness and transparency using key
use cases, and formalizes our proposal. Section 4 discusses
validation.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Fairness
Fairness in crowdsourcing has mainly been considered in
providing fair wages and managing malicious workers. In
[2] and [17], wage discrimination is viewed as the wrongful
rejection of work, unfair compensation amount, or delayed
payment. In [21], a quality-based reward scheme provides
compensation that depends on the quality of a worker’s con-
tribution. Vuurens et al. proposed measures to detect and
counter malicious users since they observed that nearly 40%
of the answers they received from AMT were from malicious
users [20].
Studies that address malicious workers through task as-
signment and worker reputation focus on the quality, relia-
bility, and total cost of worker contributions. Examples of
existing task assignment schemes include offering low-cost,
reliable answers [7, 11], and accounting for worker skills to
maximize the requester’s total gain from the completed work
[8]. These schemes are requester-centric and do not guaran-
tee fair task assignment to workers.
Overall, we observed that while some work have developed
ways of enforcing fair wages and helping requesters detect
malicious workers, no holistic approach has been developed
to address fairness as a whole for all crowdsourcing pro-
cesses.
2.2 Transparency
Bederson et al. claimed that higher transparency in work-
ing conditions such as hourly wage, or in requester expecta-
tions such as work quality metrics, lead to fairness [2]. They
asserted the need for requester and platform transparencies
to address discrimination but did not tackle its systematic
implementation.
Requester transparency has been shown to have positive
effects on worker engagement. Studies show that providing
workers with information about the requester leads to higher
engagement and more effort in task completion [16]. More-
over, providing workers with information about the crowd-
sourcing workflow and helping them feel part of a group,
result in more contributions and higher accuracy [13].
Different initiatives implement transparency in crowdsourc-
ing platforms through plug-ins. Turkopticon [9] is a plu-
gin for AMT that lets workers review tasks and requesters.
Crowd-Workers [3] and Turkbench [6] provide expected hourly
wages when workers browse tasks. The MobileWorks plat-
form [15] facilitates worker-to-worker communication and
assigns manager roles to some workers, allowing workers to
monitor each other and benefit from each other’s experience,
which results in higher quality contributions.
Transparency for workers comes from worker initiatives
and communities mainly through forums such as Turker Na-
tion and Mturk Forum4 where workers share information
about tasks, requesters and tools to enhance their experi-
ence. These tools are often worker-made scripts that dis-
close information hidden by the platform such as the time
until automatic approval of a submission on AMT.
In summary, workers strive for transparency as it is of-
ten fragmented and external to platforms. In this paper, we
advocate a systematic way of expressing and enforcing trans-
parency in crowdsourcing platforms through a formalization
of fairness and transparency axioms.
3. PROPOSAL
In this section, we first discuss scenarios where discrimi-
nation and opacity can hinder workers’ and requesters’ ex-
perience. We then formalize our framework and discuss how
we can enforce fairness and transparency in crowdsourcing
systems.
3.1 Scenarios
3.1.1 Discrimination
In Task Assignment. Task assignment, the process through
which workers find tasks to complete, is central to crowd-
sourcing. In platforms such as AMT and CrowdFlower, re-
questers post tasks, and qualified workers choose the ones
they like. This simple task assignment mechanism could be
characterized as fair because workers have access to the same
set of tasks.
Aside from self-appointment, many task assignment al-
gorithms have been designed to optimize a particular ob-
jective. However, these algorithms can be discriminatory
[14]. For instance, requester-centric task assignment allo-
cates tasks to workers so as to maximize the total gain of
the requester. This could be discriminatory to workers. On
the other hand, a worker-centric assignment that allocates
tasks based on workers’ preferences is more likely to be fair
to workers, by favoring their expected compensation, but
may be unfavorable to requesters.
In Task Completion. In task completion, workers and re-
questers have different goals. Requesters aim to get enough
good results while workers’ objectives range from getting
paid to improving their skills, spending their time wisely,
or signaling their presence and achievements to others [12].
These goals may be advantageous to one but unfair to the
other.
For example, in survey tasks, requesters usually publish
more HITs than necessary to get a good number of re-
sponses. There are cases when a requester cancels tasks
when she gets the target number of acceptable responses.
Requesters do so to reduce their waiting time and avoid pay-
ing more than needed. However, this would be unfair to a
worker who has partially completed a task but is not paid for
her efforts. A requester may also experience discrimination
during task completion in the case of malevolent workers.
4http://www.mturkforum.com/
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In Worker Compensation. Discriminatory compensation
has been identified as one of the major problems for crowd
workers [2, 17]. For instance, in AMT, a requester may
reject valid work and not pay the worker. In some other
cases, a requester promises to provide a bonus when a worker
completes a series of tasks but does not do so in the end.
In collaborative tasks, a worker may contribute more than
another and still receive the same amount of payment.
3.1.2 Opacity
Requester Opacity. In Turker Nation, workers often com-
plain about requesters who reject their contribution without
providing feedback. For example, a requester who posts a
text summarization task may not publish how a worker’s
contribution will be evaluated. This requester opacity does
not only negatively affect workers’ experiences but also af-
fects other crowdsourcing processes. If a contribution is re-
jected, it is reflected in the worker’s history and statistics
thus it may limit future task assignment opportunities. If
a worker is provided means to post a review of a requester,
this may encourage requesters to be more transparent.
Platform Opacity. Since a platform facilitates the entire
crowdsourcing process, it must provide valuable information
to help requesters and workers achieve their goals [2]. For re-
questers, it is important to see worker statistics and progress
to help them monitor tasks. For workers, it is beneficial to
have access to various information that could help them se-
lect and complete tasks such as requester reviews and rat-
ings, payment schedules, and estimated worker performance
in comparison with other workers. Currently, CrowdFlower
shows ratings per task in its task browsing interface and
the Turkopticon plug-in shows requester ratings in AMT [9].
Nevertheless, there is currently no systematic way for plat-
form developers and for requesters to specify which informa-
tion should be made transparent.
3.2 Fairness and Transparency Axioms
In this section, we attempt to define and formalize fair-
ness and transparency axioms. Our proposal does not aim
to be exhaustive. Rather, it provides a framework to de-
fine and extend a series of axioms that govern checking if a
crowdsourcing system abides by fairness and transparency
goals, in a principled fashion, or for designing a fair and
transparent platform from scratch.
We consider a set of tasks T = {t1, . . . , tn}, a set of
workers W = {w1, . . . , wp} and a set of skill keywords S =
{s1, . . . , sm}.
Tasks. A task t is a tuple (idt, idr, St, dt) where idt is a
unique task identifier, idr a unique requester identifier, and
St is a vector 〈t(s1), t(s2), . . . , t(sm)〉 where each t(sj) is a
Boolean value that denotes the requirement or not of having
skill sj to qualify for task t. A reward dt is given to a
worker who completes t. To capture a variety of tasks, skill
keywords may be interpreted as expected workers’ interests
or qualifications.
Workers. A worker w is a tuple (idw, Aw, Cw, Sw) where
idw is the worker’s unique id, Aw is a set of self-declared
worker attributes such as demographics and location, Cw
is a set of computed worker attributes such as a worker’s
acceptance ratio, and Sw is a skill vector 〈w(s1), . . . , w(sm)〉
where each w(sj) is a Boolean value capturing the interest
of w in the skill keyword sj .
3.2.1 Fairness
We define fairness axioms for task assignment, worker
compensation and task completion.
Axiom 1 (Worker fairness in task assignment).
Given two different workers wi and wj, if Awi is similar to
Awj and Cwi is similar to Cwj , and Swi is similar to Swj ,
then wi and wj should have access to the same tasks.
Similarity can be platform-dependent and ranges from
perfect equality to threshold-based similarity.
Axiom 2 (Requester fairness in task assignment).
Given two tasks ti and tj posted by different requesters idri
and idrj , if the required skills for the two tasks Sti and Stj
are similar, and the two tasks offer comparable rewards dti
and dtj , then ti and tj should be shown to the same set of
workers.
Skill similarity can be computed using different measures
such as cosine similarity.
Axiom 3 (Fairness in worker compensation).
Given two distinct workers wi and wj who contributed to the
same task t, if their contributions are similar, they should
receive the same reward dt.
Different measures could be used to compute similarity
of contributions depending on the nature of those contribu-
tions, e.g., for textual contributions, n-grams could be used
[4], for ranked lists, using measures such as Discounted Cu-
mulative Gain [10] would be more appropriate.
Axiom 4 (Requester fairness in task completion).
Requesters must be able to detect workers behaving mali-
ciously during task completion.
Axiom 5 (Worker fairness in task completion).
A worker who started completing a task should not be inter-
rupted.
3.2.2 Transparency
It is believed that limiting worker and requester anonymity
may lead to fairer labor practices [2]. Therefore, letting
workers and requesters reveal information about themselves,
ranging from their true identity, to historical worker perfor-
mance, for example, may help raise everyone’s trust in the
platform. Transparency axioms govern what requesters and
platforms should make available to workers in order to en-
sure their fair treatment.
Axiom 6 (Requester transparency).
A Requester must make available requester-dependent work-
ing conditions such as hourly wage and time between sub-
mission of work and payment, and task-dependent working
conditions such as recruitment criteria and rejection crite-
ria.
Axiom 7 (Platform transparency).
The platform must disclose, for each worker w, computed
attributes Cw such as performance and acceptance ratio.
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3.3 Implementation
We discuss our preliminary thoughts on how fairness and
transparency could be implemented and enforced.
3.3.1 Fairness
Our axioms form a framework to check how fair an ex-
isting crowdsourcing system is and also develop guidelines
for designing fair crowdsourcing processes from scratch. Us-
ing the axioms discussed in Section 3.2, we intend to de-
velop fairness check benchmarks and algorithms for existing
crowdsourcing systems.
Particular attention needs to be given to checking fair-
ness due to the inter-dependencies between crowdsourcing
processes. For instance, an algorithm that checks worker
fairness in task assignment must check the fairness of deriv-
ing computed attributes such as worker’s performance.
3.3.2 Transparency
We advocate the use of a declarative high-level language to
specify fairness rules. Such rules can be used by requesters
to disclose task requirements, recruitment criteria, evalua-
tion scheme, and payment schedule. Platform designers can
use these rules to disclose relevant information that they
want to show both workers and requesters. Rules can also
be translated into human-readable descriptions for workers’
consumption. Last but not least, the declarative nature
of those rules will allow easy comparison across platforms.
Guiding principles for such a language can be found in works
on privacy policy declaration such as in [1].
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Evaluation
When measuring fairness and transparency, objective mea-
sures such as quality of worker contribution and worker re-
tention, can be used in controlled experiments to quantify
the level of fairness and transparency of a system as well as
its effectiveness.
4.2 Research agenda
Regarding fairness, our immediate agenda is to review ex-
isting algorithms for task assignment, strategies for worker
compensation, and approaches for task completion, to assess
their discriminatory power.
Regarding transparency, we plan to run a user study to
validate what kind of transparency choices workers are most
sensitive to. Meanwhile, we started designing a declarative
language in which transparency rules can be expressed.
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